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u
ourts and Congress are, at 
times, engaged in a kind of 
ongoing “conversation” about 
statutory law. Congress has 
exclusive power to enact stat-
utes — but when statutory language is 
unclear, or doesn’t explicitly resolve 
a factual question that arises under a 
statute, courts must resolve the issue 
through statutory interpretation. 
Congress then may choose to “over-
ride”1 judicial interpretations with 
which it disagrees (so long as the judi-
cial decision is not constitutional in 
nature) by amending the law at issue 
or enacting a new law. The power to 
enact such overrides is core to main-
taining democratic accountability for 
policy. Enactment of an override, how-
ever, is not the end of the story. As 
new cases arise, courts must assess 
how the new statutory language has 
changed the prior legal landscape. And 
so the exchange continues.
Earlier commentators, including 
many well-respected judges, have 
offered thoughtful suggestions for 
facilitating communication from 
courts to Congress about problems in 
statutes that Congress might want to 
address.2 My research explores the 
opposite question. How effective is 
communication from Congress back 
to courts? The answer is: Not very.3 
Even when Congress enacts overrides, 
courts frequently continue to follow 
the prior judicial precedent. This is 
likely due more to information failure 
than willful disregard of controlling 
law. Nonetheless, a key aspect of the 
separation of powers is broken. 
My research shows that when the 
Supreme Court overrules a prior deci-
sion, lower courts quickly decrease 
their reliance on the old precedent and 
begin to apply the new rule. By contrast, 
when Congress enacts an override, 
citation patterns to the prior prece-
dent change very little. Even a decade 
later, many overridden precedents, or 
what I have called “shadow precedents,” 
are still routinely cited as controlling 
precedent.
This surprising finding may be 
partially explained by the coding pro-
tocols used by leading legal research 
services. When assessing the viabil-
ity of precedent, both Westlaw and 
Lexis consider primarily judicial sig-
nals rather than legislative signals; 
accordingly, it can take several years 
before a decision is “flagged” as having 
been affected by later legislation. Even 
when aware of an override, legal actors 
sometimes fail to follow the new stat-
utory standard. Luckily, this problem 
is easy to address. Courts need to 
start their research with the statutory 
language itself, rather than a judi-
cial gloss on the statutory language. 
Sometimes there are difficult interpre-
tive questions regarding the scope of 
an override, but often it’s just a mat-
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ter of carefully considering whether 
the operative language supersedes 
any aspect of a prior interpretation. By 
taking this straightforward approach, 
courts can help ensure that overrides 
can play their expected role in our 
tri-partite system of government. 
Courts Often Rely on  
Overridden Precedents
Congressional overrides are typically 
described as the legislative equiva-
lent of a judicial overruling. My study 
with Professor Brian Broughman was 
the first to empirically test this charac-
terization. We constructed a database 
of Supreme Court decisions that had 
been overruled by later Supreme Court 
decisions; Supreme Court decisions 
that had been overridden by later stat-
utory amendments; and a “control” 
group of Supreme Court decisions 
that were similar (in terms of subject 
matter, year of decision, and other 
factors) to the overruled and overrid-
den decisions but that had not been 
repudiated by subsequent judicial or 
legislative actions.4 We then used 
Lexis’s Shepard’s service to assess how 
often each Supreme Court case in our 
database was cited by other courts, 
generally looking at a 15-year window 
that spanned from five years prior to 
the superseding “event” — either over-
ruling or overriding — to ten years 
after it.5 Although citation counts are 
admittedly a somewhat blunt mea-
sure, they are frequently used in legal 
and political science studies as a rough 
gauge of the ongoing precedential 
weight of a prior decision. By collect-
ing citation data from several years 
before the superseding event, we were 
able to establish a “baseline” citation 
pattern, which we could then compare 
to citation levels after the overruling 
or the override. We hypothesized that 
citation patterns could be expected to 
change in two different ways: “posi-
tive” or “neutral” citations would be 
expected to decline, and “negative” 
citations, such as an indication that the 
prior decision had been fully or par-
tially overruled or superseded, would 
be expected to increase. To capture 
both of these effects, we developed 
a measure we called “net citations,” 
which we defined as the number of pos-
itive or neutral citations to a decision, 
minus the number of warning or other 
negative citations.6 We then compared 
the average number of net citations a 
case received each year after the event 
to the average number of net citations 
the case received before the event; this 
ratio measures how much effect the 
overruling or override had on citation 
levels.
Our findings were striking. As shown 
in Figure 1 below, after a judicial over-
ruling, net citations to the prior decision 
drop rapidly when compared to the pre-
event baseline. The citation patterns 
for cases in our “overridden” category, 
by contrast, are very similar to those of 
our control group. Overall levels of cita-
tions drop, but in a gradual fashion that 
is typical of the natural “depreciation” 
that decisions generally experience 
over time.7 
Even ten years after an override is 
enacted, most overridden precedents 
are still widely cited as controlling 
precedent.
Degree of Overruling or Override. We 
recognize that an override may super-
sede some, but not all, of the analysis in 
a prior decision, meaning other aspects 
of the decision remain controlling. 
The same, of course, is true for a judi-
cial overruling. To assess whether this 
affected our results, the cases were 
assigned a “depth” measure that eval-
uated how completely the overruling 
Supreme Court decision or overriding 
legislation rejected the prior opinion,8 
as well as an “explicitness” measure 
that evaluated how explicit the Court 
or Congress was about its disapproval 
of the prior opinion. We found that 
for both sets of cases, greater “depth” 
was associated with a larger decline 
in citations; however, at each level of 
“depth,” citations to overruled cases 
declined more dramatically than cita-
tions to the overridden cases. The 
same was true for “explicitness.” Thus, 
our findings are not the result of com-
paring deep and explicit overrulings 
to shallow and non-explicit over-
rides. Rather, even when we control 
for these factors, we find that judicial 
overrulings have considerably more 
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effect on future citations than legisla-
tive overrides.
As an additional robustness check, 
for a randomly selected subset of cases 
in both groups, we hand-coded individ-
ual headnotes to distinguish between 
headnotes identifying portions of the 
prior decision that had been super-
seded and those that had not. Since 
Lexis’s Shepard’s service tracks cita-
tions to each headnote in a case, this 
allowed us to assess in a more fine-
grained manner which propositions 
within each case were being referenced 
when later decisions cited to the earlier 
precedents. For both groups of cases, 
we found a notable decline in net cita-
tions to the headnotes associated with 
specific propositions within the cases 
that had been superseded, but again 
this decrease was much more pro-
nounced for the overruled cases than 
the overridden cases. Additionally, we 
assessed the extent to which ideologi-
cal preferences might explain ongoing 
citation of overridden precedents, but 
our data did not suggest a judge’s ide-
ology was the driving factor.9
Prospectivity. Because a judicial overrul-
ing is a reinterpretation of existing law, 
it typically takes effect immediately; the 
Court’s new interpretation will apply to 
all pending disputes, including those 
arising out of events that pre-dated 
the new opinion. By contrast, statutory 
overrides are typically prospective; the 
old (now superseded) judicial standard 
will govern the resolution of a dispute 
arising out of events that pre-date the 
effective date of the statutory amend-
ment, even if the decision in the case 
is issued after the effective date of the 
amendment. For this reason, we would 
expect to see a judicial overruling have 
a more immediate effect on net cita-
tion levels than a statutory override. To 
address this issue, our analysis excluded 
citation counts from the year of the 
superseding event and the first two 
years after the superseding event, as 
this is the window when we expect the 
difference between retroactive judicial 
overrulings and prospective statutory 
overrides to be most salient. We modi-
fied these parameters to exclude greater 
and fewer years, but our general results 
held, suggesting that the differences we 
observe are not driven by the prospec-
tive nature of overrides.10 
* * * *
Since this study relies on citation 
counts, rather than a close reading of 
the context for each citation, we cannot 
definitively assert that any particular 
citation of an overridden case was in 
error. Below, I provide specific exam-
ples, drawn from my work on overrides 
in the employment discrimination con-
text, of both “proper” and “improper” 
citations to overridden cases. The big 
picture conclusion is clear, however. If 
overrides were having the effect that 
they are intended to have, it is rea-
sonable to assume that there would be 
sizeable decline in citations to legisla-
tively overridden precedents, just as 
there is a sizeable decline in citations 
to judicially overruled precedents. 
Instead, on average, citation patterns 
to the overridden cases are almost 
indistinguishable from those to the 
comparison control group of cases that 
have been neither overridden nor over-
ruled. This suggests that often courts 
fail to hear — or to heed — Congress’s 
side of the dialogue.  
Westlaw and Lexis Coding 
Protocols Often Fail to Flag that a 
Precedent Has Been Overridden
Judicial overrulings may be more effec-
tive than legislative overrides in part 
because the coding protocols used by 
leading legal research services, such 
as Westlaw’s KeyCite system and 
Lexis’s Shepard’s system, are far bet-
ter at identifying the former than the 
latter. The services’ coding protocols 
rely almost exclusively on judicial sig-
nals rather than legislative signals.11 
This approach reflects the common 
law roots of American law; the coding 
protocols are based on the assumption 
that only a subsequent judicial decision 
will affect the precedential weight of 
a prior judicial decision. Under these 
protocols, when the Supreme Court 
overrules a prior precedent, coders 
will generally add a “red-flag” or a 
“warning” signal to the prior prece-
dent immediately. By contrast, coders 
are generally not expected to assess 
whether legislative actions affect the 
precedential value of judicial decisions; 
an overridden precedent typically will 
not be flagged unless or until a court 
asserts in a decision that new statutory 
language has superseded a prior judi-
cial interpretation. After a court has 
made such a declaration, coders should 
add a cautionary or warning signal to 
the prior decision. However, Westlaw 
will only red-flag a decision if a court 
at the same or a higher level in the 
judicial hierarchy indicates a change 
in the precedential value of the case. 
Even ten years 
after an override 
is enacted, most 
overridden 
precedents are 
still widely cited 
as controlling 
precedent.
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This means that Supreme Court cases 
that have been overridden will only be 
red-flagged on Westlaw if the Supreme 
Court itself explicitly indicates that the 
prior decision has been superseded by 
the subsequent legislation.12
This can result in surprisingly long 
lag times — on average, more than 
four years (!) — before a legislatively 
overridden precedent is flagged at all, 
and only about 20 percent of over-
ridden Supreme Court decisions are 
red-flagged on Westlaw.13 That said, 
this average masks significant differ-
ences. A leading study distinguishes 
between overrides that explicitly 
denounce prior judicial interpretations 
as incorrect, what the study terms 
“restorative” overrides, and over-
rides designed to update or clarify a 
statute, often in response to a judicial 
invitation to do so.14 Many precedents 
superseded by restorative overrides 
are flagged within a few months. By 
contrast, it often takes several years 
before precedents that are affected by 
an updating or clarifying override are 
flagged; some may never be flagged. 
This may be because updating or clar-
ifying overrides receive less attention 
from popular and legal media. They are 
also often part of larger overhauls of 
statutory law, such as a major reform 
of bankruptcy or tax law, rather than 
standalone bills that are clearly respon-
sive to prior Supreme Court decisions. 
The irony is that courts often explicitly 
invite Congress to enact updating or 
clarifying overrides, on the theory that 
new policy should come from the leg-
islature rather than the judiciary — but 
even if Congress does so, the old prece-
dents may continue to hold sway.
My work in this area has focused on 
congressional overrides of Supreme 
Court decisions. However, Congress 
also frequently supersedes lower court 
decisions, sometimes resolving a circuit 
split or an area of confusion before the 
Supreme Court weighs in.15 While my 
research did not look at this directly, it 
is likely that there may be even longer 
delays before such lower court deci-
sions are flagged as superseded. 
Courts Often Struggle to 
Recognize and Interpret 
Congressional Signals  
in Overrides
My empirical study with Professor 
Broughman shows that citations to 
overruled precedents decline quickly, 
but citations to overridden precedents, 
on average, do not. This suggests that 
overrides do not have as much impact 
as they should. In part, this is likely 
due to the Westlaw and Lexis coding 
protocols discussed above. But even 
when aware that an override has been 
enacted, lower courts must assess the 
extent to which the new statutory lan-
guage supersedes the prior judicial 
interpretation. This is often straight-
forward; it simply requires that courts 
carefully apply the standard in the 
revised legislation. But in some cases, it 
can be difficult to determine the scope 
of the override. I have conducted case 
studies of employment discrimination 
overrides that illustrate some of the 
issues that can arise.
Mistakes in Applying New Statutory 
Language. The ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008 (ADAAA) explicitly repudiated 
prior Supreme Court decisions that had 
interpreted the meaning of “disability” 
in the Americans with Disabilities Act 
very stringently.16 The ADAAA’s stated 
purpose was to “reinstat[e] a broad 
scope of protection” under the ADA.17 
It passed with high levels of bipartisan 
support and was signed by President 
George W. Bush. Several years after it 
was enacted, I assessed the degree to 
which courts were appropriately fol-
lowing the new statutory standards.18 
I found that, with some regularity, 
courts continued to apply the overrid-
den cases for propositions that were 
unquestionably superseded by the 
new statute.19  
The mistakes fell into two catego-
ries. First, there were decisions that 
failed to mention the ADAAA at all, 
even though the events giving rise to 
the dispute occurred after the effec-
tive date of the ADAAA.20 These cases 
simply applied the prior precedent as 
if the ADAAA had never been enacted. 
Second, there were many decisions in 
which courts observed (correctly) that 
the ADAAA had superseded the pre-
ADAAA precedent in some respects 
but then asserted (incorrectly) that the 
relevant portion of such precedent still 
I found several 
cases in which 
the flawed 
reasoning of one 
court was cited 
and followed by 
other courts. 
In other words, 
once a court 
has incorrectly 
characterized 
the scope of an 
override, it can 




applied, even in contexts where the 
judicial interpretations at issue were 
clearly and indisputably incompati-
ble with the new statutory language. 
Courts also sometimes observed (cor-
rectly) that the ADAAA had superseded 
pre-ADAAA Supreme Court precedent, 
but then followed circuit court prece-
dent based on the superseded Supreme 
Court precedent, without acknowledg-
ing that the circuit precedent should 
also be reconsidered in light of the 
new statutory language. For example, 
numerous lower courts applied prior 
Supreme Court and circuit court prece-
dent concerning what was necessary to 
establish that a plaintiff was “regarded 
as” having a disability, even though the 
amended statute established a new, far 
more flexible standard for “regarded 
as” claims.21 
Our adversarial system depends 
primarily on lawyers to identify the 
relevant law and make arguments that 
will benefit their clients. I assume that 
in many of these cases, the lawyers 
failed to properly use the new statu-
tory standard in their briefs. However, 
even if lawyers make such mistakes, 
judges have an independent responsi-
bility to apply the governing statutory 
law.22 Additionally, sometimes the 
party who would have benefited from 
the new language was pro se, making 
it even more imperative that judges 
research the applicable law carefully.
In many instances, the legal mistake 
may not have affected the outcome of 
the specific case, as there may have 
been independent grounds that justi-
fied the ultimate decision. However, 
the error is still problematic. I found 
several cases in which the flawed rea-
soning of one court was cited and 
followed by other courts. In other 
words, once a court has incorrectly 
characterized the scope of an override, 
it can be difficult to stamp out.  
Moreover, the ADAAA was an unusu-
ally direct override that received 
significant attention in both the pop-
ular media and the legal press. Indeed, 
in terms of absolute numbers, citations 
to the precedents overridden by the 
ADAAA dropped quickly and dramati-
cally.23 The prevalence of mistakes even 
in this high-profile context suggests 
that mistakes likely make up a large 
portion of ongoing citations to overrid-
den precedents in general, since most 
overrides are not as clear or prominent 
as was the ADAAA. 
Interpretative Complexity Sometimes 
Arises in Implementing Overrides. 
I have also explored situations in which 
judges could reasonably disagree about 
whether the override statute or the 
pre-existing precedent should apply. 
One common question is whether the 
statutory language fully repudiates the 
reasoning, as well as the result, of a prior 
decision. For example, in 1978, Congress 
overrode a Supreme Court decision that 
had held that pregnancy discrimination 
was not a form of sex discrimination.24 
Lower courts have since disagreed 
about how to resolve cases involving 
similar issues, such as discrimination on 
the basis of breastfeeding or contracep-
tive access. Some courts have concluded 
that Congress implicitly adopted the 
reasoning of the dissenting justices in 
the original case, whereas other courts 
suggest that the majority’s reasoning 
continues to control resolution of these 
related matters.25 
It may also be unclear how an over-
ride should be interpreted when 
Congress amends one statute to super-
sede a judicial interpretation but does 
not make comparable amendments 
in other statutes that are typically 
interpreted in pari materia. For exam-
ple, in 1991, Congress amended Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act to partially 
codify and partially override a judi-
cially-crafted causation standard. 
Congress did not amend other employ-
ment discrimination statutes, but the 
House Judiciary Committee stated in a 
report that it expected these statutes 
would be interpreted “consistently” 
with the standard in the override.26 
When deciding cases brought under 
other discrimination statutes after the 
1991 amendments, some lower courts 
applied the causation standard in the 
override, and others applied the prior 
precedent.27 Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court rejected both these standards, 
announcing a different standard that 
it held applied to the private-sector 
provisions of the age discrimination 
statute, and, in a subsequent case, Title 
VII’s retaliation provisions.28 Courts at 
all levels continue to grapple with how 
the Supreme Court’s more recent deci-
sions apply to other federal statutes.29 
As this article was being finalized for 
publication, the Supreme Court was 
actively considering two more cases 
that arise from this series of events.30 
Courts must also determine what 
causation standard applies to state 
laws modeled on these federal laws, 
a question made particularly difficult 
by the fact that many state statutes 
address age along with traits covered 
by Title VII.31 Similar questions arise 
even when Congress agrees with a 
judicial interpretation, if it codifies that 
interpretation in the statute but does 
not make comparable changes in other 
statutes with similar language.32  
In my earlier work, I argue that rely-
ing on overridden precedents in these 
kinds of situations can undermine 
interests usually served by following 
precedent, such as fairness, efficiency, 
and predictability. Such reliance can 
also thwart congressional intent. In the 
causation cases discussed above, the 
Supreme Court has suggested that if, in 
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1991, when Congress amended Title VII 
to supersede the Court’s prior inter-
pretation of Title VII, Congress wanted 
its preferred causation standard to 
apply more generally, it should have 
simultaneously amended all other anti-
discrimination statutes with language 
similar to that in Title VII. The Court 
then characterized Congress’s fail-
ure to do so as an affirmative “choice” 
by Congress that a different standard 
should apply.33 I have argued that this 
conjecture does not reasonably reflect 
the institutional realities within which 
Congress operates. As an alternative, 
I have suggested interpretive con-
ventions that I believe would allay 
confusion about the scope of overrides 
and better accord with likely congres-
sional intent. Specifically, I argue that 
enactment of an override should cre-
ate rebuttable presumptions that (1) 
both the reasoning and result of the 
prior interpretation is superseded; and 
(2) similar language in other statutes
should be interpreted in accordance
with the override, so long as that appli-
cation is a reasonable interpretation of
the pre-existing statutory language.34
A full explication of these propos-
als is beyond the scope of this article. 
Here, I simply highlight that there are 
sometimes complicated interpreta-
tive questions implicit in interpreting 
overrides. This may be at least a partial 
explanation for why overrides have 
less effect on subsequent citation pat-
terns than overrulings. To address this 
problem, Congress or the Supreme 
Court should provide greater clarity 
about how lower courts should resolve 
these kinds of questions.  
Judges — and Other Legal 
Actors — Can Make  
Overrides Work Better
Overrides are not self-implementing. 
They are only effective if other legal 
actors properly apply the new statu-
tory standard, rather than the prior 
judicial precedent. As this article has 
shown, that process often breaks down. 
Luckily, there are some ready fixes. 
Start with the Statute. When doing 
legal research in a statutory case, law-
yers and courts should always begin 
their analysis with the statute itself. 
If judicial precedents interpreting the 
statute predate any statutory amend-
ments, the current operative statutory 
language should be carefully assessed 
to determine whether and to what 
extent it supersedes the prior judicial 
analysis. It may be helpful to consult 
the “finding and purposes” sections for 
the statute, as Congress may identify 
particular judicial decisions that have 
motivated statutory changes.35 Such 
preambles may not be codified adja-
cent to the substantive provision, or 
they may not be codified at all, but they 
can easily be found in the public law. 
Committee reports and other reliable 
legislative history can also provide 
helpful context. 
Explicitly Recognize Overrides in 
Opinions. As discussed above, the cod-
ing protocols used by Westlaw and 
Lexis rely almost exclusively on courts 
to assess the precedential weight of 
prior decisions. This means there 
can be a multi-year delay before an 
overridden precedent is flagged as 
superseded, and some overridden 
precedents are never flagged.  Judges 
can mitigate this problem simply by 
stating explicitly in their decisions that 
a statutory amendment supersedes or 
partially supersedes a prior precedent. 
Such statements should result in the 
earlier decision being flagged, even if 
the court ultimately determines it is 
appropriate to rely on the overridden 
precedent in resolving the particular 
question at hand. In subsequent dis-
putes, lawyers and courts will then be 
more likely to assess properly whether 
the new statutory language affects the 
application of the prior precedent.
Identify Overridden Precedents in 
Statutory Language. Congress should 
also take steps to improve the efficacy 
of overrides. Congress often pro-
vides explanations for why a statute 
is being amended, including approval 
or disapproval of judicial decisions, 
in committee reports.36 When pos-
sible, comparable statements should 
be included in the statute itself. This 
should facilitate more prompt flag-
ging by legal research services.37 
Additionally, this would likely be more 
effective in informing statutory inter-
pretation, as there are some judges 
who categorically refuse to consider 













scale revisions of substantive law 
often implicate numerous Supreme 
Court and lower court decisions; it 
could be quite unwieldy (and counter 
to existing drafting norms) to mention 
all relevant decisions in the statutory 
text. Accordingly, Congress’s failure to 
identify a precedent as impacted by a 
new law should not be interpreted as a 
signal that the prior precedent remains 
controlling.38 If the substantive statu-
tory language does not accord with the 
interpretation in a prior judicial opin-
ion, the statutory language controls, 
whether or not the statute mentions 
the prior decision. 
Clarify Effect on Related Statutes. When 
enacting an override, Congress should 
also consider whether there are other 
statutes that are typically interpreted 
in pari materia and, if so, whether it 
intends to have the override apply to 
these other statutes. Where practi-
cable, such as where there is a clearly 
defined and limited number of statutes 
with similar language, Congress could 
make changes to all such statutes.39 In 
some instances, it might be extremely 
difficult to identify and amend all 
other statutes with similar language.40 
Nonetheless, Congress should at least 
make statements in “findings and pur-
poses” clauses that indicate its intent 
as to the scope and application of an 
override. (These same approaches also 
apply when Congress agrees with or 
essentially codifies a judicial interpre-
tation.) I have also argued the Supreme 
Court should reconsider the inferences 
it draws from congressional “silence” 
in this context to better reflect the 
realities of congressional process.41 
Improve Legal Research Functionality. 
Finally, Westlaw and Lexis should con-
sider making changes to their coding 
protocols to identify overridden prec-
edents more clearly and more quickly. 
The Congressional Research Service, 
the Legislative Counsel’s office, or 
other relevant agencies also could 
compile lists of overrides. Any and all 
of these reforms can help overrides 
better achieve their intended effect.
Conclusion
My research in this area boils down 
to a simple point: Overrides often fail 
to actually override. By taking steps 
to ensure that statutory research 
properly assesses the significance of 
legislative change, and by recogniz-
ing that there may be significant lag 
time before legal research services 
flag earlier decisions as having been 
superseded, courts and lawyers can 
play a key role in making overrides 
more effective. This will protect and 
promote core principles of democratic 
accountability built into the structure 
of our government.   
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1 I use the term “override,” rather than “overrule,” 
purposefully. Congress, of course, does not have 
the power to “overrule” a court — only a court 
can do so. But Congress can enact new statutory 
language that effectively nullifies or supersedes 
a court’s conclusion or interpretation, which I 
refer to as an act of overriding. Overruling, by 
contrast, carries its regular meaning: a judicial 
decision by a court at the same or a higher level 
in the judicial hierarchy that rejects or sets aside 
a prior judicial decision.  
2 See, e.g., roBerT A. KATzmAnn, JudgIng sTATuTes 
94–102 (2014); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert 
L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps For Legislators 
and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 mInn. 
L. rev. 1045, 1059–81 (1991); Wilfred Feinberg, A 
National Court of Appeals?, 42 BrooK. L. rev. 
611, 627 (1976); Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. 
Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 hArv. L. 
rev. 1417, 1429–32 (1987).
3 This article highlights findings from several 
more extensive studies I have conducted. See 
Brian J. Broughman & Deborah A. Widiss, After 
the Override: An Empirical Analysis of Shadow 
Precedent, 46 J. Leg. sTuds. 51 (2017) [hereinafter 
After the Override]; Deborah A. Widiss, Still 
Kickin’ After All These Years: Sutton and Toyota 
As Shadow Precedents, 63 drAKe L. rev. 919 (2015) 
[hereinafter Still Kickin’]; Deborah A. Widiss, 
Identifying Congressional Overrides Should Not Be 
This Hard, 92 Tex. L. rev. see ALso 145 (2014) [here-
inafter Identifying Overrides]; Deborah A. Widiss, 
Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra 
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